Glassie v Prime Minister [2007] CKHC 8; PLAINT 27 of 2007 (21 June 2007)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE COOK ISLANDS
HELD AT RAROTONGA
(CIVIL DIVISION)

PLAINT NO. 27/07

BETWEEN

NANDI GLASSIE, MP of Atiu
Island
Plaintiff

AND

THE PRIME MINISTER
as head of the Government
Cabinet.
First Defendant

AND

THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSIONER
Second Defendant

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
COOK ISLANDS
Third Defendant

Mr Vakalalabure for Plaintiff
Mr Mitchell for Defendants

Date: 21 June 2007

DECISION OF WESTON J

[1] I have before me an application brought by the Defendants to strike out a cause of action in a Statement of Claim issued by Mr Glassie as Plaintiff.

[2] I have heard detailed argument and have also received written submissions from counsel.

[3] The allegations in the Statement of Claim are that Mr Glassie was employed in the public service pursuant to a contract that commenced on the 30th of July 2004 for a two year term. In December 2005, he commenced working for the Prime Minister and in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim it is pleaded that certain arrangements were then discussed and agreed between the Prime Minister and Mr Glassie with the effect that Mr Glassie would continue to be employed by the Public Service Commissioner for so long as the Prime Minister remained in power. Counsel has said that the calculations assume that this would be at the least until 2010 which is the next scheduled election.

[4] The Statement of Claim is constructed on the basis that the arrangement between the Prime Minister and Mr Glassie amounted to a variation of the existing contract. The terminology used throughout the Statement of Claim, is one of variation and I think that is the appropriate way to refer to the matter. However, it would have been possibly made clearer if it was alleged by way of an estoppel that Mr Glassie had refrained from seeking new or different contractual terms as a result of the assurances given by the Prime Minister. In the event, it may not make much difference because there are two provisions in the contract that need to be considered. I now set out clauses 3.2 and 15.2 as follows:

"Clause 3.2. The Head of Ministry acknowledges the fixed term nature of this agreement and that nothing in this agreement shall be construed to create an expectation of reappointment or an entitlement to continue to employment beyond the expiry date. No assurances or arrangements for any renewed or subsequent agreement shall bind either party unless such assurance or arrangement is in written signed by both parties."

"Clause 15.2. It is expressly recognized that the parties may from time to time agree to vary the terms and conditions of this agreement and that the employer must consult/obtain written consent of the Head of Ministry before finalizing any such variation. No variation shall have any legal effect unless it is in writing and signed by both parties."

[5] The second sentence in paragraph 3.2 is, I believe, particularly important because it appears to provide for the eventuality that occurred in this case. In effect, Mr Glassie says that there were assurances or arrangements entered into which had the effect of extending his contract beyond the two year term. The parties in effect had contracted out of estoppels.

[6] As I understand the law, in these circumstances the express contractual terms would mean that the estoppel cannot arise. That is because an estoppel assumes there is an injustice if the representation is not to be enforced. But where the parties have agreed by contract that that shall not happen, it is difficult to see that there is an injustice if they are held to the two year term. Therefore as I understand the case, it was not possible for the Prime Minister and Mr Glassie effectively to agree or in some other way to add such that the two year term would be extended. On that basis I think the claim needs to be approached assuming there is a maximum term of two years.

[7] None of this however, is fatal to the claim. As I understand the pleadings, and of course, my ruling is given by reference to the pleadings and I have not heard any evidence, Mr Glassie was removed from his employment wrongfully. He is entitled to seek, certainly compensatory damages and also general damages for pain and suffering, although I express this may be a case where punitive damages are appropriate if the Plaintiff is satisfied that the conduct was sufficiently outrageous to justify punitive damages. All of those are matters for counsel to discuss with the Plaintiff.

[8] Counsel for the Plaintiff has reminded me on a number of occasions as to the high standard of any strikeout application. I have referred counsel to the decision Tiffin J in the High Court of New Zealand in Marshall Futures which used the analogy of a car wreck saying that the Court would only strike out a claim if it was satisfied that no repairs could be undertaken.

[9] I am satisfied that this Statement of Claim can survive in some shape or size and that further pleadings can be made. I am not satisfied however, that it is proper to plead damages on the basis of a contract extending beyond a two year term.

[10] Mr Mitchell has raised a number of arguments about first, certainty and secondly, as to whether a public servant could be a Member of Parliament. In light of the way I have approached this case, I do not think I need to get into those issues. If this claim is pleaded on the basis that the maximum term of the contract was two years, then it seems to me that the Plaintiff’s subsequent election as an Member of Parliament is not a relevant issue, and for that reason I do not address it.

[11] The application to strike out is in a sense successful, not that I am striking out the first cause of action per se but that I am ordering that the claim proceed on the basis that the contract was limited to two years and the estoppel for foreshadowed in paragraph 13 of the Statement of Claim, cannot in those circumstances have any chance of succeeding.

[12] I direct that the Plaintiff within 28 days file an amended pleading consistent with my direction.

[13] Mr Mitchell, having heard what I have directed as above asked me to clarify the consequences of my order. The difficulty facing me is that the cause of action set out under the heading "C. Cause of Action" is that differently pleaded aspects of this might survive. Mr Mitchell’s objection principally focuses on the text in the claim under the heading "Particulars" and then the prayer for relief that follows after that.

[14] For the avoidance of doubt, the consequence of my ruling is that those pleadings cannot survive in that form. That is because they assume that the contract was for a period of longer than two years and for the reasons set out above, I have found that as an untenable argument. Equally for the avoidance of doubt, I do not strike out the cause of action in its entirely but the future form that will be dependent on upon counsel’s consideration of my decision and re-pleading of it.

[15] I invited submissions from counsel on the question of costs as suggesting that it may be appropriate however to reserve costs. On reflection Mr Mitchell agreed and although he is strictly entitled to costs, he ask they be reserved for consideration at a later time. I did not see any need to call on Mr Vakalalabure. In those circumstances, accordingly, I reserve the question of costs for further consideration.

Judge